SYNOPSIS. As the history of science has developed as a professional intellectual discipline, it has had and will continue to have an important role in defining science and its place in our culture. Such definitions should be based on as much information as possible. Scientists can help supply some of this information through participation in symposia on the history of science. In addition, scientists can learn much about the nature of their discipline by becoming aware of the concepts of science which are derived from the careful analysis of its history. Efforts should be made to bring historians of science and scientists together for their mutual benefit.
This symposium marks the beginning of what I hope will be a continuing formal involvement of the American Society of Zoologists in the history of science and, in particular, the history of zoology. Since it is the first, it seems appropriate that someone attempt to express some justification for such involvement.
I am certain many members of the Society are interested in the history of their discipline and many more will admit that there is value in something vaguely called the historical perspective. Despite this interest and this acknowledged value in the history of science, the question arises: Why should a professional scientific society such as ours engage in formal discussions of the history of science now that the history of science has emerged as a highly respected intellectual discipline with its own professional societies and its own journals (Roller, 1971) ? On the surface it would seem that the existence of professionally trained historians of science obviates our organizing programs in the history of science. I will argue that in fact the existence of the history of science as an intellectual discipline makes our involvement in it particularly important.
I have argued elsewhere (Atkinson, 1977) that the history of science should be
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an important part of graduate education in the sciences. Today I will concentrate on the role that the history of science ought to have in the intellectual life of the American Society of Zoologists and its sister organizations in the sciences.
First, I will consider the nature of our contribution to the discipline of the history of science. What can we, as practicing scientists, contribute to the work of the historians of science? The history of science is more than a recounting of the lives and work of a few great scientists. The modern historian of science seeks to understand the role of science in the history of ideas: he explores the relationships among ideas in science and between science and the culture of which it is an important part. The raw materials for such analyses are the published papers and books written by scientists along with whatever diaries, journals or correspondence scientists may have maintained. The scientist, on the other hand, seeks to understand nature, the world of our empirical experience. Concerned primarily with communicating with fellow scientists, the scientist does not usually write papers or books with the historian in mind. The large numbers of papers being published in the journals and the even larger number submitted for publication have, of necessity, resulted in the reduction of such papers to the bare essentials. The experiments that failed, the approaches that did not work out, the speculations without sound empirical support, and the meta-physical underpinnings of the work reported do not appear in print. To the historian all of these are important pieces of information. Whereas some of this information may be found in diaries, journals or correspondence, few scientists have maintained such informal records of their work and fewer still have made them readily available to historians. Thus the historian of science is often severely limited by the lack of what he would consider information vital to a valid understanding of the nature and influence of science. Our participation in symposia such as this one can help fill this gap. We have all played a part in the continuing history of our discipline and there are many among us who can provide direct testimony on the development of major ideas in our discipline and on the thought and methods of the great scientists who have enriched our past.
Some modern historians of science have seen that an important gap in our knowledge of the nature and history of science is the lack of adequate analyses of the community structure of science. As T. S. Kuhn (1970) has expressed it: "Scientifiic knowledge, like language, is intrinsically the common property of a group or else nothing at all. To understand it we shall need to know the special characteristics of the groups that create and use it." More historians and sociologists of science will attempt analyses of various scientific communities such as Mitroff (1976) has done with NASA. The American Society of Zoologists is a community of scientists as are the divisions within the Society and their informal subdivisions. The maintenance of archives and the presentation of histories of these divisions can contribute to the analysis of the community structure of science and thus to our understanding of science itself.
Scientists have on occasion taken historians to task for describing a world which does not fit their experience (Ebert, 1977) . This is partially due to the fact that scientists and historians view a common material from different perspectives with different purposes in mind. Despite their differences, however, there is a common element: the attempt to relate the ideas and discoveries of scientists to one another. Scientists as well as historians have insights into these relationships and should be encouraged to express these insights. Since the scientists is, in a sense, part of the subject matter of the historian, the way in which he views his own history is, in itself, a source of information for the historian.
Let me now turn the coin over and discuss some ways in which familiarity with the work of professionally trained historians of science can and ought to contribute to our work as scientists.
Norwood Russell Hanson remarked (1965) that "profitable philosophical discussion of any science depends on a thorough familiarity with its history and its present state." In other words there is an intimate relationship between the philosophy of science and the history of science. As the latter has emerged as a legitimate professional discipline, its impact on the former has been increasingly profound. Our concept of science itself is changing. The positivist's notion of science as an essentially empirical discipline is being rejected (McMullin, 1976) . Perhaps the best expression of the new concept of science is that of J. T. Clark (1969) : " . . . a successful scientific theory is a pure invention of active intelligence. It is guided, of course, by past successes and is consciously relevant to known experience. But it remains a creatively designed reconstruction of experienced events and not merely an ideographic reproduction of the experientially real. It is, in short, quite literally a guess at the way in which the world is made, but an educated and severely disciplined one." What is more, historians of science would tell us that the process by which a scientific community comes to evaluate such "educated guesses" is complex and involves matters of belief as well as empirical test. There is considerable disagreement among historians of science as to the relative role of belief in theory assessment, ranging from those who would stretch T. S. Kuhn's paradigm concept to the point of considering all i science to be a question of faith, to those who reject Kuhn's ideas as denying any empirical input to science (See Lakatos and Musgrave, 1970 , for a full discussion of the impact of Kuhn's ideas.) Even those who reject Kuhn's ideas and look to empirical falsification as the principal process in theory assessment admit that scientists will often make ad hoc modifications of an accepted theory in the face of apparent empirical disproof (Lakatos, 1970; L0vtrup, 1976) . No doubt the role of beliefs in theory assessment will remain as a source of considerable debate in the history of science. It seems safe to say at this point, however, that the theories that have been discarded in the past were not necessarily proven false nor by the same token are our current theories accepted because empirical counter-instances are unknown. I believe it to be of great importance that scientists become aware of such concepts of science. To illustrate the impact that such awareness can have on the ideas of contemporary scientists, I will briefly discuss the recent book by Stephen Jay Gould, Ontogeny and Phytogeny (1977) .
The book is divided into two parts: The first is an historical account of the idea of recapitulation; the second, a presentation of Gould's ideas regarding the relationship between embryonic development and evolution. Part One reveals that Gould is indeed aware of the concepts of science and its history which are developing within the discipline of the history of science. It also contains a good deal of excellent historical scholarship in its own right. Gould argues forcefully that, contrary to popular belief, Haeckel's theory of recapitulation (the biogenetic law) did not fall due to the accumulation of empirical counter-instances but " . . . only when it became unfashionable in approach (due to the rise of experimental embryology) and finally untenable in theory (when the establishment of Mendelian genetics converted previous exceptions into new expectations)" (Gould, 1977) . The second part of the book builds on the first. I find the ideas presented in this portion very thought-provoking and of great importance to anyone interested in evolution and/or development. Although a full analysis of Gould's ideas is outside the purview of this paper, it is clear to me that they owe their origin at least in part to Gould's awareness of the concepts of science discussed above. I do not believe Gould would have conceived of the relationship between development and evolution in the manner in which he did if he had accepted the popular misconception that the biogenetic law had been empirically falsified; i.e., if he had had the naive concept of science that is all too often presented in the historicalphilosophical chapters of our introductory texts.
If we ignore the work of historians of science we are doing ourselves and our disciplines a disservice; we are narrowing our perspective, closing out an important source of insight into our own work. Perhaps Masterman (1970) put it better when she wrote "The history of science by its nature as part of the history of ideas, has got to be a discipline which helps actual scientists to get a deeper insight into the real nature of their own science."
My hope is that symposia such as this will attract historians of science as well as scientists so that each can learn from the other. Unfortunately, both are often guilty of a tendency to speak only to those within their own group, an increasingly homogeneous community of specialists. This tendency to specialize is perhaps characteristic of our time. There are those who view it as a serious threat to the future of science. One such person is Steohen Toulmin who claimed (1974) that we have entered what he calls the "Alexandrian Trap." That is, that science in the latter half of the 20th century seems to be repeating the intellectual path of the scientists of Alexandria in the 1st and 2nd centuries A. D. who began to narrow their concerns to increasingly specialized areas and at the same time became preoccupied with technological problems, losing sight of the major issues which had made previous science the great human enterprise it had been. Toulmin suggests that these same tendencies exist in the present and are, in part, responsible for an increasing public uneasiness with science and even disillusionment among some scientists with the ideals of science. I cannot concur with all of Toulmin's ideas in this regard. However, it does seem to me essential that we do all we can to encourage communication among scientists and those non-scientists who are interested in the nature of science. I believe that symposia such as this one on the history of science offer such an opportunity.
In conclusion, the history of science as a discipline has played and will continue to play an important part in defining science and its role in our culture. It is important that such definitions be based on as much information about science's past and present as possible. If scientists are to continue to seek a basic understanding of the world of our experience it is essential that they be aware of the nature of that undertaking, its possibilities and limitations. Such an awareness, it seems to me, requires a familiarity with the ideas developing within the history of science. Professional societies such as ours should do whatever is possible to promote such familiarity. Both historians of science and scientists can profit thereby.
